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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-"CURRENT TOTAL DISABILITY"
BENEFITS ARE NOT LEGITIMATE. Arkansas Secretary of State v.
Guffey, 291 Ark. 624, 727 S.W.2d 826 (1987).
On July 27, 1981, J.T. Guffey suffered an injury compensable
under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act' while employed by
the office of the Arkansas Secretary of State (Secretary). Guffey re-
ceived temporary total benefits 2 from July 28, 1981 until April 25,
1983. At that time the Workers' Compensation Commission found
that his healing period3 had ended and that he had sustained a fifty-
five percent permanent partial impairment to his right foot.4 The Sec-
retary paid Guffey compensation for fifty-five percent permanent par-
tial impairment to the right foot as a scheduled injury pursuant to the
Workers' Compensation Act.5
After undergoing further surgery on his foot in September of
1984, Guffey claimed additional benefits for an alleged period of disa-
bility existing from April 26, 1983 to September 20, 1984. At an Oc-
tober 26, 1984 administrative hearing, Guffey originally contended
1. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -811 (1987) (formerly codified at ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 81-1301 to -1367 (1976 and Supp. 1985)).
2. Temporary total disability benefits refer to benefits awarded for a period of time
within the healing period in which an employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages. See
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-102(5), -519 (1987). See also Arkansas State Highway and Transp.
Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (1981).
3. "Healing Period" is defined under the Workers' Compensation Act as "that period for
healing of an injury resulting from an accident." ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(6) (1987).
More specifically, the Arkansas Court of Appeals has held:
The healing period continues until the employee is as far restored as the permanent
character of his injury will permit. If the underlying condition causing the disability
has become stable and if nothing further in the way of treatment will improve that
condition, the healing period has ended. The persistence of pain may not of itself
prevent a finding that the healing period is over, provided that the underlying condi-
tion has stabilized.
Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 131-32, 628 S.W.2d 582, 586 (1982) (citing 2 A.
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.12 (1981)). Generally, the termina-
tion of the healing period determines when temporary benefits cease and when the extent of
permanent disability can be appraised for purposes of making a permanent partial or a perma-
nent total award. 2 A. LARSON, supra 57.12(b). See also Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 271 Ark.
385, 392, 609 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Ark. App. 1980) (Newbern, J., dissenting).
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-521(f) (1987) allows permanent partial disability benefits to
a claimant who has suffered a partial loss of the use of a member when the loss of use is of a
permanent nature.
5. Scheduled injuries are those specifically provided for in ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-521
(1987).
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that he was either permanently totally disabled6 or "currently totally
disabled"7 during the period in question. However, Guffey later
dropped his claim of permanent total disability and the administrative
law judge heard evidence only on Guffey's entitlement to current total
disability benefits.8
The administrative law judge denied current total disability bene-
fits for Guffey,9 and he appealed to the full Workers' Compensation
Commission.10 The Commission affirmed the denial of current total
disability benefits, holding that there is no authority for an award of
such benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act."' Guffey then
appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.12 The court of appeals
reversed the Commission, holding that there is clear statutory author-
ity for the award of current total disability benefits after expiration of
the healing period.
13
6. Permanent total disability exists when a claimant suffers a total incapacity to earn
wages due to injury and such incapacity will not improve with time. See generally 2 A. LAR-
SON, supra note 3, § 57.13. Permanent total disability is not defined by the Arkansas Workers'
Compensation Act.
7. Current total disability was generally held to be an award of total disability benefits
for an indefinite period of time pursuant to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(a) (1976) (now codi-
fied at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-521 (1987)). See, e.g., City of Humphrey v. Woodward, 4
Ark. App. 64, 628 S.W.2d 574 (1982); Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 271 Ark. 385, 609 S.W.2d 102
(Ark. App. 1980). Current total disability is not mentioned in the Arkansas Workers' Com-
pensation Act.
8. The parties agreed that the only question before the administrative law judge was
whether Guffey was entitled to receive current total disability benefits after April 25, 1983.
Arkansas Secretary of State v. Guffey, 291 Ark. 624, 626, 727 S.W.2d 826, 827 (1987).
9. The administrative law judge held that Guffey failed to prove his entitlement to cur-
rent total disability benefits. See Guffey v. Arkansas Secretary of State, 18 Ark. App. 54, 56,
710 S.W.2d 836, 837 (1986).
10. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-704 (1987) provides for an appeal to the full Workers' Com-
pensation Commission after receipt by the claimant of the judgment of the administrative law
judge. The Commission reviews the evidence de novo.
11. WCC Claim No. D108623 (10-24-85). The Commission ruled that Guffey had not
proven his entitlement to permanent total disability regardless of the fact that the parties had
agreed that the only issue before the administrative law judge was Guffey's entitlement to
current total disability benefits.
12. Ark. S. Ct. R. 29 provides for the appeal to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
13. The court of appeals relied heavily upon ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(a) (1976) (now
codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-519 (1987)) and several Arkansas Court of Appeals cases
decided subsequent to the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision of McNeely v. Clem Mill and
Gin Co., 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966) (affirming an award of "total disability" benefits
without requiring a finding of either permanent or temporary nature of such benefits). The
court of appeals also reversed the Commission's determination that Guffey was not entitled to
permanent total disability. The court held that, because the parties had withdrawn the issue of
permanency at the administrative hearing, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Grooms, 10 Ark.
App. 92, 661 S.W.2d 433 (1983) required reversal inasmuch as the Commission had based its
decision on a finding of fact which was clearly not in issue or developed by the evidence.
Guffey v. Arkansas Secretary of State, 18 Ark. App. 54, 710 S.W.2d 836 (1986).
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On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed,I4 holding that
the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act does not authorize the
award of "current total" or "limited total" disability benefits after the
end of the healing period.15 Arkansas Secretary of State v. Guffey, 291
Ark. 624, 727 S.W.2d 826 (1987).
States first enacted workers' compensation legislation in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century as a result of what one
notable authority has described as a simultaneous increase in indus-
trial accidents and a decrease in workers' common law tort reme-
dies. 16 Before such enactments, employees were without a common
law remedy in at least eighty-three percent of all cases against em-
ployers.17 Eventually, society recognized that "in a modern industrial
state the risk of injury to workmen ... is a social risk, chargeable to
the business itself, the losses arising from which are to be added to the
productive cost and to be borne ultimately by the community."18 It is
from this perspective that the law of workers' compensation
developed. 19
The typical workers' compensation act provides for cash-wage
benefits and medical care benefits to employees who are the victims of
work-related disabilities or injuries and for death benefits to the em-
ployee's dependents. 20 In exchange for these assured benefits, the em-
ployee and his dependents are normally not allowed to maintain a
civil action against the employer for an injury covered by the workers'
compensation system.2 1 The cost of the system is ultimately borne by
society via adjustments in the price the employer requires for his
14. Thomas S. Streetman, Special Justice, wrote the court's opinion. Justice Purtle filed a
concurring opinion in which he stated that he considered the majority's language too broad in
that it may be misinterpreted as holding that "injured workers are barred from receiving suc-
cessive or interrupted periods of temporary total or partial disability." 291 Ark. at 629, 727
S.W.2d at 828. Justices Hayes and Glaze did not participate in the court's ruling.
15. The court also held that the court of appeals was correct in reversing the Commis-
sion's determination of permanent total disability. Id. at 628-29, 727 S.W.2d at 828.
16. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 4.00. However, Larson does note that there appeared to
be the beginnings of a trend to cut back employers' defenses. This trend was pre-empted by
the Workers' Compensation Legislation. Id.
17. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 4.30.
18. Kawaler, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation Statutes: A Blessing or a
Burden, 9 WORK. COMP. L. REV. 720 (1986) (quoting, I. HONNOLD, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION 9-10 (1918)).
19. For a more detailed discussion of the conditions and circumstances which gave rise to
the development of compensation acts, see 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, ch. 11 (1985).
20. Employer's defenses have been largely eliminated. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
105 (1987).
21. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-105 (1987) (providing for exclusivity of remedies when




Workers' compensation legislation commonly defines four cate-
gories of compensable disability.23 There are two variables: degree of
disability (partial or total), and duration of disability (temporary or
permanent).24 The resulting categories are temporary total disability,
permanent total disability, temporary partial disability, and perma-
nent partial disability. 25 Almost all states provide scheduled bene-
fits,26 which are a type of permanent partial disability benefits, for loss
of body members or, more commonly, loss of use of body members.27
The issue in Arkansas Secretary of State v. Guffey28 arose because the
Arkansas Court of Appeals attempted to add a category to the four
listed above. The category at issue in Guffey, current total disability,
is not the same as temporary total disability or permanent total disa-
bility under Arkansas law. Temporary total disability may be
awarded only within the healing period, 29 whereas current total disa-
bility may be awarded after the healing period and can continue indef-
initely.3° Permanent total disability is a final adjudication of the
claimant's condition and entitles him to total disability benefits for the
rest of his life. 31 Current total disability, however, awards total disa-
bility benefits only for an indefinite period of time and implies that
there will be a later re-evaluation as to the extent of the claimant's
22. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, §§ 1.10-1.20 (1985).
23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5) (1987) defines "disability" for workers' compensation
purposes. It is "incapacity because of injury to earn, in the same or any other employment, the
wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-
519 to -527 (1987) governs the awards of benefits due to disability.
24. See generally 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 57.12(a).
25. Id. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act does not specifically provide for cate-
gories of disability. The definition section, ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102 (1987) (formerly
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1302 (1976)), does not even mention the terms. However, § 11-9-
102(5) does define "disability." See supra note 22. Consequently, case law has almost entirely
defined the terms in Arkansas. In addition, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-501 to -506 (1987)
(formerly ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1310 (1976)) and ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-519 to -526
(1987) (formerly ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313 (1976)) seem to contemplate the four-category
scheme.
26. Scheduled awards are fixed statutory "schedules" or lists of benefits a claimant will
receive for the loss or loss of the use of specific body parts. The schedules of most states
include, for example, specified amounts for toes, eyes, hearing in one ear, hearing in both ears,
etc. See J. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS COMPENSATION 45-58 (1987).
27. For a discussion of schedule benefits, See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 58.00 (1987).
28. 291 Ark. 624, 727 S.W.2d 826 (1987).
29. Arkansas State Highway and Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d
392 (1981).
30. See, e.g., Electro-Air v. Villines, 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.W.2d 932 (1985).
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-519 (1987).
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entitlement of benefits.32
In 1939 Arkansas became the forty-seventh state33 to enact
workers' compensation legislation.34 The Arkansas Supreme Court
soon held that, because the Act is highly remedial in nature, it there-
fore should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes. 35 This pol-
icy of liberal construction has continued to the present.36 In
furtherance of this policy, Arkansas courts have traditionally been re-
quired to resolve all doubts as to coverage in favor of the claimant.37
The genesis of current total disability has been attributed to the
Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in McNeely v. Clem Mill and Gin
Co. 38 In McNeely the claimant suffered a scheduled injury for which
he received the statutory compensation. 39 Later the claimant brought
an additional claim in which the Commission found that he was "to-
32. Electro-Air v. Villines, 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.W.2d 932 (1985).
33. At that time there were only 48 states in the Union, thus making Arkansas the next to
the last state to enact such legislation. The only malingerer as of 1939 was Mississippi.
34. The original Act, 1939 Ark. Acts 319, was later amended by Init. Meas. 1948, No. 4
§ 1 at 1949 Ark. Acts 1420 (amended by 1976 Ark. Acts 1337, § 1).
35. Stout Const. Co. v. Wells, 214 Ark. 741, 217 S.W.2d 841 (1949); E.H. Noel Coal Co.
v. Grilc, 215 Ark. 430, 221 S.W.2d 49 (1949); Elm Springs Canning Co. v. Sullins, 207 Ark.
257, 180 S.W.2d 113 (1944); Williams Mfg. Co. v. Walker, 206 Ark. 392, 175 S.W.2d 380
(1943); Mack Coal Co. v. Hill, 204 Ark. 407, 162 S.W.2d 906 (1942).
36. City of Waldo v. Poetker, 275 Ark. 216, 628 S.W.2d 329 (1982) (citing Aired v. Jack-
son Atlantic, Inc., 268 Ark. 695, 595 S.W.2d 249 (Ark. App. 1980) (Workers' Compensation
Act is highly remedial and is therefore entitled to liberal construction)); Aluminum Co. of
America v. Henning, 260 Ark. 699, 543 S.W.2d 480 (1976) (declining to adopt a narrow con-
struction of ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1317 (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-701
(1987)) and 81-1319 (1976) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-801 to -811 (1987)) and
reaffirming that the Act must be given a liberal construction in light of its beneficent and
humane purpose); International Paper Co. v. McGoogan, 255 Ark. 1025, 504 S.W.2d 739
(1974) (Workers' Compensation Act enacted for beneficent and humane purposes and in giv-
ing effect to these purposes it must be construed liberally).
37. Central Maloney, Inc. v. York, 10 Ark. App. 254, 663 S.W.2d 196 (1984); O.K.
Processing, Inc. v. Servold, 265 Ark. 352, 578 S.W.2d 224 (1979) (the Workers' Compensation
Commission must draw all legitimate inferences and resolve doubts in favor of the claimant,
viewing and construing the evidence in fav6r of the claimant. The purpose of the Workers'
Compensation Act is to compensate those who, by reasonable construction, are within the
terms of the Act). The rule in Servold, which appears to implicate the claimant's burden of
proof, has probably been overruled by the enactment of § 10, 1986 Ark. Acts 10 (now codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-704 (1987)) which provides that, when weighing evidence, the
Administrative Law Judge and Commission shall not give the benefit of the doubt to either
party. This legislation does not, however, appear to overrule Maloney wherein all doubts as to
whether a particular claim is covered by the Workers' Compensation Act must be resolved in
favor of the claimant.
38. 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966).
39. The claimant suffered the total loss of the use of his right leg below the knee. That is a
scheduled injury under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(c)(21) (1986) (now codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 11-9-521(e) (1987)).
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tally disabled."'  Upon that finding the Commission ordered that the
claimant receive additional benefits.4' The supreme court analyzed
the case as presenting the question "whether an employee who suffers
a scheduled injury which proves to be totally and permanently disa-
bling is entitled only to the restricted compensation specified for the
scheduled injury or to the greater benefits provided for total and per-
manent disability."42 In holding that the claimant was entitled to the
greater benefits provided by permanent total disability, the court re-
lied heavily upon section 81-1313(a) of Arkansas Statutes Anno-
tated,4 3 which provides that, in all non-specified cases, permanent
total disability" shall be determined in accordance with the facts of
the particular case.4" The court then briefly took note of the em-
•ployee's complaint that the Commission, in finding the claimant's dis-
ability to be total, did not affirmatively designate it as permanent, but
rather found that the duration of the disability was not determinable
at the time of the hearing.46 The court responded, "we fail to see how
[the employer is] hurt by the commission's deferment of this question
until the exact extent of the disability might become clearer" in light
of the fact that there was substantial evidence that could have sus-
tained a finding of permanence.47 This dicta was later relied on by the
court of appeals in upholding current total disability compensation.48
Fourteen years later in Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates,49 the Arkansas
Court of Appeals authorized an award of "total disability" to a claim-
ant after the healing period ended. The court held that section 81-
1313(a)5' and section 81-1302(e)52 plainly meant "that if [a claimant]
40. 241 Ark. at 499, 409 S.W.2d at 503.
41. Id.
42. 241 Ark. at 498, 409 S.W.2d at 503 (emphasis added).
43. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(a) (1960) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-519
(1987)).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. The statute had not changed by the time Guffey was decided. The statute reads:
"Loss of both hands, or both arms, or both legs, or both eyes, or any two [2] thereof shall, in
the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, constitute permanent total disabil-
ity. In all other cases, permanent total disability shall be determined in accordance with the
facts." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(a) (1976) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
519(b) and (c) (1987)).
46. 241 Ark. at 501, 409 S.W.2d at 504.
47. Id. This was only in dicta and was not the holding of the case.
48. See Guffey v. Arkansas Secretary of State, 18 Ark. App. 54, 710 S.W.2d 836 (1986).
49. 271 Ark. 385, 609 S.W.2d 102 (Ark. App. 1980).
50. Id. At the time Sunbeam was decided, McNeely had not been regarded as authorizing
non-permanent benefits after the healing period.
51. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(a) (1976) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
519(a) (1987)) reads: "In case of total disability, there shall be paid to the injured employee
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is totally incapacitated to earn in the same or any other employment
the wages he was receiving at the time of his injury, then he is entitled
to receive weekly benefits during the continuance of such total disabil-
ity.""3 This award of total disability benefits after the healing period,
without any determination of permanence, and with no cap on the
amount which could ultimately be received by the claimant, 4 is what
ultimately became termed "current total disability" benefits."
Judge Newbern vigorously dissented from the majority's opinion
in Sunbeam.56 In his opinion, the Workers' Compensation Act
should be interpreted as imposing a duty upon the Commission, at
some point, of making a final determination of permanent disability or
lack thereof." He believed that the Commission should make that
determination when the healing period has ended and there is no
prospect of rehabilitation within the purview of section 81-1310(f). 8
during the continuance of such total disability sixty-six and two thirds percent (66 2/3%) of his
average weekly wage .... "
52. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1302(e) (1976) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
102(5) (1987)) reads: "(e) 'Disability' means incapacity because of injury to earn, in the same
or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the
injury."
53. Sunbeam Corp. v. Bates, 271 Ark. at 389, 609 S.W.2d at 104.
54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-501, -502 (formerly ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1310 (Supp.
1979)) provides caps on the payment of money compensation and specifically provides that the
only categories which shall not have a cap are permanent total disability and death benefits.
The majority in Sunbeam, however, did not address this statute.
55. See, e.g., Pitts v. Western Electric, 15 Ark. App. 85, 689 S.W.2d 582 (1985). Judge
Newbern's dissent in Sunbeam dubbed the concept "limited total disability." 271 Ark. at 390,
609 S.W.2d at 105 (Newbern, J., dissenting); see also City of Humphrey v. Woodward, 4 Ark.
App. 64, 628 S.W.2d 574 (1982); Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d
582 (1982).
56. 271 Ark. at 389, 609 S.W.2d at 105. Judge Newbern initially noted that the majority
had not cited any precedent for its allowance of total disability benefits beyond the healing
period and "during the continuance of such total disability" either from Arkansas or any other
jurisdiction. Id. He then opined that "[tihe entire basis for... this new kind of 'limited' total
disability is the fact that Sunbeam will not hire the [claimant]." Id. Judge Newbern argued
that ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1310 (Supp. 1979) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-501
to -507 (1987)) should control the periods of compensation a claimant is entitled to receive.
271 Ark. at 390-91, 609 S.W.2d at 105. More importantly, he asserted that both ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 81-1310 (1976) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-505(c) (1987)) (providing
that a claimant's request for payment of rehabilitation expenses must be filed prior to a deter-
mination of the claimant's permanent disability) and decisions typified by International Paper
Co. v. McGoogan, 255 Ark. 1025, 504 S.W.2d 739 (1974) (holding claimant was entitled to
temporary total disability benefits during his healing period) contemplate that at some point a
final determination of permanent disability, or lack of it, should be made. 271 Ark. at 389-94,
609 S.W.2d at 105-07.
57. 271 Ark. at 393-94, 609 S.W.2d at 106-07. See supra note 56.
58. 271 Ark. at 393-94, 609 S.W.2d at 107. See supra note 56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-
1310(f) (1976) is now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-505 (1987).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
In 1982 current total disability was finally given its label. In City
of Humphrey v. Woodward59 the court of appeals affirmed an award
of current total disability on the authority of Sunbeam.' In dicta, the
court attempted to clarify the concept of current total disability as
''an award [of total disability benefits] which will not cease until some
undetermined time in the future."61 Later, in Mad Butcher, Inc. v.
Parker,62 the court of appeals reversed an award of temporary total
disability to a claimant where the healing period had ended.6  How-
ever, the court then remanded the case to the Commission to deter-
mine whether the claimant would be entitled to current total
disability in light of the holdings of Sunbeam and City of Humphrey.
6
1
The court of appeals again attempted to clarify the current total
disability doctrine in Electro-Air v. Villines.6' The claimant had com-
pleted her healing period and sustained a twenty percent permanent
disability to one foot.6 6 The employer contended that an additional
award of current total disability was not in conformity with prior doc-
trine.67 In upholding the award of current total disability the unani-
mous court stated:
[T]he fact that the total disability may not last forever is not harm-
ful to the employer or the insurance carrier. The cases in which
current total disability is awarded are those in which the Commis-
sion is not quite ready to admit that a claimant will never be able to
return to work.68
Finally, in 1986 the court of appeals decided Guffey v. Arkansas
59. 4 Ark. App. 64, 628 S.W.2d 574 (1982).
60. Id. at 65, 628 S.W.2d at 575.
61. Id. at 67, 628 S.W.2d at 575.
62. 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982).
63. Id. at 131, 628 S.w.2d at 585 (relying on International Paper Co. v. McGoogan, 255
Ark. 1025, 504 S.w.2d 739 (1974) (holding that temporary total benefits are payable from the
date of injury to the end of the healing period)). See supra note 59. The court in Mad Butcher
did not cite Arkansas State Highway and Transp. Dep't v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613
S.w.2d 392 (1981) (holding that temporary total disability existed only within the healing
period) which would appear to control the issue more directly.
64. 4 Ark. App. at 65, 628 S.W.2d at 574. This process of reversing the award of tempo-
rary total disability benefits because the healing period had ended, followed by remanding for a
determination of current total disability benefits on the authority of Sunbeam and City of
Humphrey, was followed in Moro, Inc. v. Davis, 6 Ark. App. 92, 638 S.W.2d 694 (1982).
65. 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.w.2d 932 (1985).
66. Id. at 104, 697 S.w.2d at 933.
67. Id. at 106, 697 S.W.2d at 934-35.
68. Id. at 107, 697 S.w.2d at 935 (emphasis added). The court suggested that the Com-
mission must have thought there to be a possibility that the claimant would "learn to manage
her persistent pain and once again return to the job market as a productive worker." Id.
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Secretary of State.6 9 In reversing the Commission, the court held
that there was clear statutory authority for awarding total disability
benefits for an indefinite period of time after the healing period has
ended. 7' This issue was then appealed to the Arkansas Supreme
Court.
The supreme court began its analysis of the statutory legitimacy
of current total disability by acknowledging that the Workers' Com-
pensation Act is entitled to a liberal construction with all doubts re-
solved in favor of the claimant.72 However, where the Act is clear
and not subject to interpretation, the court must adhere to the law as
enacted and may not award benefits which are not provided for in the
Act.73 Since the court knew of no decisions on point from other states
or authoritative writings concerning this issue,74 the court relied only
on McNeely v. Clem Mill and Gin Co. ,7 and the Arkansas Workers'
Compensation Act to determine whether current total disability bene-
fits could be awarded.
7 6
The court noted that the court of appeals and the Commission
interpreted McNeely as allowing some temporary benefits to be paid
after the end of the healing period.77 The court then clarified Mc-
Neely by stating that "[t]o the extent that McNeely has been inter-
preted as holding that temporary benefits, regardless of how they are
denominated, may be paid after the end of the healing period, that
interpretation is erroneous. "78
The court then addressed the issue of whether the Arkansas
Workers' Compensation Act authorized the payment of current total
69. 18 Ark. App. 54, 710 S.W.2d 836 (1986).
70. Id. at 56, 710 S.W.2d at 837.
71. Id. at 56, 710 S.W.2d at 837-38. See also supra note 13.
72. Arkansas Secretary of State v. Guffey, 291 Ark. 624, 627, 727 S.W.2d 826, 827 (1987).
See also supra notes 35-36.
73. 291 Ark. at 627, 727 S.W.2d at 827. The court noted that the Act does not mention
current total disability benefits, and the Arkansas Supreme Court has never specifically author-
ized them. Id.
74. Guffey's attorneys conceded during oral argument that they were unaware of legisla-
tion or cases from other jurisdictions which permit payment of current total disability benefits
after the healing period ends. The court also noted that none of the text writers discuss the
award of non-permanent total benefits beyond the healing period. Id at 628, 727 S.W.2d at
828.
75. The court acknowledged: "[t]he concept of current total disability benefits seems to
have been based on our decision in McNeely v. Clem Mill and Gin Co., 241 Ark. 498, 409
S.W.2d 502 (1966) although that terminology is not expressly mentioned in that case." 291
Ark. at 628, 727 S.W.2d at 828.





disability benefits after the healing period. In a brief, conclusory sen-
tence, the court held that it was not willing to give such a construc-
tion to the Act. 79 The court then reversed the court of appeals and
held that the Commission's assertion that it had no legal authority to
award current total disability benefits after the expiration of the heal-
ing period was correct.8 0
Guffey appears to withdraw Arkansas from an anomalous posi-
tion in the field of workers' compensation law. The majority of states
regard the end of the healing period as the point at which temporary
benefits cease and the extent of permanent benefits can be deter-
mined." Since Guffey reveals the truism that current total disability
benefits are temporary benefits, Arkansas is now solidly in conformity
with the majority.
Guffey can be reconciled with McNeely. In applying the statu-
tory law of Arkansas, the court in McNeely relied on a statute which
applies to permanent total disability.82 In framing the issue presented
by the case, the court referred to the benefits awarded to the claimant
as "total and permanent disability."' 83 So it is quite probable that the
McNeely court simply looked upon the Commission's award as one of
permanent total disability instead of an award of total disability bene-
fits after the healing period and with indefinite duration. This is con-
sonant with Guffey wherein the court held that McNeely did not
authorize temporary benefits after the healing period.84 Perhaps the
most striking point to note about McNeely, however, is that the issue
and the holding in McNeely is very distinct from the dicta upon which
the court of appeals later relied in supporting current total
79. The court's entire analysis of the act is as follows:
Our Act does not authorize award of current total or limited total disability benefits
after the end of the healing period. If those benefits are to be provided, it will be
necessary for the Arkansas General Assembly to determine the circumstances under
which injured workers will qualify for those benefits.
Id. at 628, 727 S.W.2d at 828.
80. Id. at 628, 727 S.W.2d at 828. Since the court could not ascertain any basis in either
McNeely or the Act for the award of current total disability benefits after the healing period,
there is therefore no legal authority for such an award.
81. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 57.12(b) and cases cited therein at footnote 7. See also
Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163 (Ak. 1982); Hudson v. Mastercraft
Div., Collins & Aikman Corp., 86 N.C. App. 411, 358 S.E.2d 134 (1987); Taylor v. Exeter
Drilling Co., 737 P.2d 1063 (1987); Amos v. Gilbert Western Corp., 103 N.M. 631, 711 P.2d
908 (N.M. App. 1985); Dane County Hosp. and Home v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n,
125 Wis. 2d 308, 371 N.W.2d 815 (1985).
82. 241 Ark. at 499-500, 409 S.W.2d at 503-04 (discussing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1313(a)
(1960) (now codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-519 (1987))).
83. 241 Ark. at 498-99, 409 S.W.2d at 503 (emphasis added).




Court of appeals cases decided subsequent to Guffey have not
allowed temporary benefits after the healing period has ended."6
However, they have allowed the claimant to establish the existence of
a new healing period for the same injury.87 This approach seems to
have support in other states 8 and can be readily harmonized with
Guffey. 89
Guffey has the effect of forcing the Workers' Compensation
Commission to cease all temporary benefits at or before the end of the
healing period and make a final determination as to the permanency
and degree of the claimant's disability. Since it is settled law in Ar-
kansas that the Commission must settle all doubts as to coverage in
favor of the claimant, 90 it is probable that this will result in an in-
crease in the number of permanent total disability benefits that will be
awarded. 9'
James Dunham
85. The holding in McNeely was that a claimant who suffered a scheduled injury which
proved to be permanently and totally disabling was entitled to the greater benefits provided by
permanent total disability instead of being limited to the restricted benefits provided by the
scheduled injury. 241 Ark. at 499, 409 S.W.2d at 503. However, the dicta from which current
total disability is said to have arisen merely took note of the fact that the Commission did not
affirmatively designate the total disability as "permanent total disability." See supra note 46.
86. Elk Roofing Co. v. Pinson, 22 Ark. App. 191, 737 S.W.2d 661 (1987); Basford v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 21 Ark. App. 223, 730 S.W.2d 916 (1987).
87. In Pinson, 22 Ark. App. 191, 737 S.W.2d 661 (1987) the court of appeals held that the
claimant's recurrence of a previous injury was causally connected to the first injury. After
determining that the claimant had entered a new healing period, the court harmonized Guffey
and allowed additional temporary total disability benefits.
88. See, e.g., Clyatt Memorial, Inc. v. Scott, 394 So. 2d 159 (Fla. App. 1981); Smitty's
Coffee Shop v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 86 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1956).
89. The court in Pinson harmonized its decision with Guffey by noting that Guffey clearly
contemplated only a single healing period when it held that there could be no award of tempo-
rary disability benefits after the healing period. Also, there is no indication that the claimant
in Guffey underwent a second healing period because of a subsequent medical complication.
Pinson, 22 Ark. App. at 195, 737 S.W.2d at 663.
90. Guffey, 291 Ark. 624, 727 S.W.2d 826.
91. This is because the cases in which the Commission would normally award current
total disability were those in which the Commission had to choose between permanent total
disability and some lesser compensation (or none at all). See supra note 65.

